Start of the Endgame?

With militia-driven Shiite violence starting to spread across Iraq after several months of relative calm, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has thrown-down the gauntlet - demanding that militias in Basra cease-and-desist from violence and turn-in their weapons within 3-days or face arrest.

It is entirely possible that thus will begin the struggle that is likely to determine the future of Iraq and, by extension, the next President of the United States of America.

Iraq has seen relative calm since about August when Shiite cleric and certified punk Muqtada al-Sadr declared a "cease fire" against US and Iraqi forces. However, the apparent resumption of hostilities by al-Sadr's Mahdi Army militia - a response to what they call recent crack-downs on their "movement" by Iraqi and US forces - could jeapordize the rather fragile calm that has allowed a fair amount of political progress to be made and is by far the most serious threat to the al-Maliki government in some time.

For the record, the US seems to be implicating "Iranian-backed rogue militia factions" for the recent uptick in violence in Basra, but is not implicating Iran directly - at least not yet.

That PM al-Maliki has issued such an ultimatum probably means one (or more) of a couple of things:
1) He believes his security forces, with US backing, can crush the rebels
2) Even if the rebels cannot be "crushed", he believes he has the upper-hand with a war-weary population and can score a political victory even if they are not completely successful militarily against the Sadirists
3) He doesn't have a choice - he cannot allow such violence to go unchallenged regardless of his national standing or the readiness of the Iraqi forces.

Undeniably, one of the great unreported stories is how Iraqi forces have taken the lead in their own country - newsworthy because it is a first and because critics of the war swore up-and-down that it would never happen - but it is an open question just how ready they are to face such a threat. The US simply cannot be seen "bailing-out" the security forces in this instance - it has to be done by Iraqis in order to be successful.

And so, I envision the following three possible outcomes:

1) The security forces rout the militias
2) The militias rout the security forces
3) The fighting ends with neither side able to claim a complete victory

Obviously, the first one is what any patriotic American should be rooting for. A clear victory by the Iraqi security forces would greatly enhance their standing with the people of Iraq, provide confidence that they can handle their own affairs, give the al-Maliki Government a much-needed boost and perhaps kick al-Sadr to the curb once and for all. Such a victory will also likely enhance and accelerate the process of political reconciliation and greatly accelerate our ability to bring US warfighters home. That a government led by a member of the Shia clan was willing (and able) to crack down on Shiite extremists would be a great message to be sent to the remaining skeptics inside and outside Iraq.

Iraq will be seen as a "success" by most of those not deeply invested in our failure - good news for patriotic Americans everywhere. And while I am certainly hoping for this outcome, I don't give it much more than a 1-in-4 chance of coming to pass. The recent performance of the Iraqi security forces notwithstanding, they've yet to demonstrate they can "win the big one" and they simply don't come bigger than this. I hope I'm wrong.

As wonderful as the first outcome would be, the second would of course be the opposite. A rout of the US-backed Iraqi security forces at this time would probably signal the end of the Iraqi security forces and, therefore, the end of the Iraqi government. The country would likely collapse along sectarian lines and we would find ourselves, once again, in the middle of a sectarian civil war. Only this time, political will in the US is already on the side of "pulling the pug" on our involvement in Iraq. Such a disintegration would likely provide the forces of cut-and-run with the political cover they need to ram-through a veto-proof "date certain" for our exit from Iraq. And it will be Saigon 1975 all over again. This would probably doom the candidacy of Senator "Architect-of-the-Surge" and saddle us with not less than 4-years of Jimmy Carter, redux.

Thankfully, I don't give that better than 1-in-5 odds, either. I simply don't think al-Maliki would have issued such an ultimatum if he thought there was more than a slim possibility he could lose badly and he's a whole lot closer to the situation than any of us. Also, I don't believe we would allow him to lose so badly and would pour recources into the fight if needed. But neither is that a particularly great outcome and leads directly to what I fear is the most likely result of all this - a highly unstable detante between the militia and the demorailized, just-had-their-bacon-saved-again-by-the-US Iraqi security forces.

It would be, I'm afraid, about as bad as the total collapse I envisioned just previously - in that all that would have been accomplished is the same collapse in slow-motion. It would be the final nail for the skeptics of our policy in Iraq and would credibly permit the emergence of "The Surge Has Failed" as a Talking Point - also dooming us come November. al-Maliki's govenment probably couldn't survive past the planned provincial elections and, while he's certainly no great shakes, the modicrum of stability his government provides - and all the political progress it has managed - will likely evaporate over a short period of time.

All we can do is watch from the sidelines, hope, and pray. I know I'll be doing all three now that the Iraqi Endgame Stopwatch appears to be ticking down to zero.